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Morality Without God
Luke Hancock
Introduction
This paper will primarily focus on an article by M. B. Wilkinson. This paper
will show that, while Wilkinson’s article can be critiqued in places, it succeeds in
bridging the is/ought gap without traditional recourse to God as lawgiver. First
summarizing Wilkinson’s argument, then examining its potential strengths and
weaknesses, this paper will ultimately argue that Wilkinson’s offered stance on
morality is tenable.

Review and Assessment
Wilkinson is presenting a foundation for morality based on natural grounds.
He gives a basic metaphysic to support this idea and bases his morality in human
nature. In doing so, Wilkinson claims to solve the is/ought problem and the
Euthyphro Dilemma, as well as surpass situation ethics and relativism as a moral
system. He does not rely on God for his morality, but gives a moral system that is
consistent with a Thomistic conception of God. Following is a summary of his
arguments.1

M. B. Wilkinson. 2015. “God, Goodness, Fact and Value.” Síntese: Revista de
Filosofia 42 (134): 397-422.
1
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Grounding morality in God raises the philosophical difficulty of the
Euthyphro Dilemma. The Euthyphro Dilemma asks the question of whether God’s
command to do something is what makes that thing good. If so, then morality
depends upon God and is therefore arbitrary. If not, then morality is independent of
God’s commands, and God’s act of commanding is unnecessary, and there is some
law greater than or above God.2 Wilkinson seeks to find a basis for a natural law or
virtue ethics approach to morality that will allow for a creative and loving God.3
The second issue a moral system must conquer is the is/ought problem.
There is a logical difficulty in moving from factual statements about the world
(certain actions cause good/evil results) to imperative moral commands (certain
actions ought/ought not to be done). This problem must be answered by any serious
system of morality.4
Having explained these problems, Wilkinson discusses theories that fail.
The idea that humans ought to follow social conventions, espoused by Hume, works
fine until disagreement arises.5 Religion and divine-command theory fall apart

2

John Cottingham. Philosophy of Religion Towards a More Humane Approach,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 76-80.
3

Wilkinson, “God, Goodness, Fact and Value,” 399.

4

Wilkinson, “God, Goodness, Fact and Value,” 399-400.

5

Ibid., 400.
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quickly as well, according to Wilkinson.6 There is a need for morality apart from
religion. Relativism also will not succeed.7
Wilkinson mentions Kekes’ suggestion that conflicting values and
obligations mean one should take moral commands with a grain of salt and
recognize the flawed system. The author argues that competing moral precepts
should not be ignored but rather the focus should be on making the proper judgment
as a good person. Borrowing from William Temple, Wilkinson strives to achieve a
unity of ethics. In order to do so, he divides ethics into three levels: deep,
motivational, and particular.
The deep has to do with “the absolute obligation to will whatever on each
occasion be right.”8 The motivational level has to do with the objectives behind the
deep. Wilkinson discusses how ethics is a human enterprise in every sense, only
humans deal with ethics, and in a Kantian way, ethics ultimately should focus on
treating humans as an end, never a means. The third level, the particular, is
concerned with specific ethical judgments on real-world topics. The author makes
the significant point that questions of ethics at this level usually have a metaphysical

6

Wilkinson, “God, Goodness, Fact and Value,” 400.

7

Ibid., 400-401.

8

Ibid., 402.
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component, whether it be ontological, concerned with the essence and nature of
what a person is, or a discussion of rights.
After establishing the need for metaphysics, Wilkinson grounds his
metaphysics in the proposition that material objects exist.9 He subscribes to
nominalism and discusses how nouns have been created for adjectival concepts,
including examples like green, kind, and justice. This leads to the conclusion that
discussion of moral goals such as justice and kindness will be plagued with
difficulties unless these terms (justice, kindness) are treated properly as adjectives
with no separate existence apart from their objects (just or kind men).
Wilkinson supplements his metaphysics with another claim, that persons
are sentient, reflective, self-directed material objects.10 This means that adjectives
can be ascribed to persons. Specifically, moral qualities (justice, kindness) can be
ascribed to persons whose actions are described by those qualities. More
significantly than the acting is the being, says Wilkinson. Humans are acting
creatures that think afterwards, so change comes about in the midst of existence. A
person acts, reflects, and changes. This is how Wilkinson bridges the is/ought gap.

9

Wilkinson, “God, Goodness, Fact and Value,” 405.

10

Ibid., 407.
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People exist and act (fact or ‘is’) and their existence and actions cause them to make
changes (value or ‘ought’).
Wilkinson makes the case that values are personal and only exist as
adjectives, not nouns, and therefore have no existence apart from the object which
is valuable. However, persons are in a constant state of change. Persons are
intentional and active, imposing values on perceptions. Values are a precondition
for actions. Human activity presupposes thoughtful consideration of the future.11
Having made these assertions about values, Wilkinson suggests one universal
moral principle: “It is proper to seek the good of persons.” This principle stems
from his anthropocentric view of value, and he backs it up with universal cultural
assent.12
While this is significant progress in a system of morality, Wilkinson holds
that all his preceding arguments are unhelpful without moral imagination, which he
claims is the key to moral outlook. He says most forms of moral failings stem from
the failure to see a person as more than a label (race, age, financial status). This
emphasis on moral imagination affects moral education, leading to a focus on
growing the ability to see situations from multiple perspectives. It affects moral
ontology as well. A proper morality begins with a proper understanding of the

11

Ibid., 411.

12

Ibid., 412.
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existence of others as people in the same way that the self is a person.13 Wilkinson
summarizes his moral theory in his statement that “It is on the basis of our
thoughtful objectivity and creative inter-subjectivity that we find the only
worthwhile ground of significant, experienced life.”14
Having formed the basis of his metaphysics, morality, and ontology,
Wilkinson solidifies his theory with his conception of goodness. He follows Davies
in saying that God is not morally good but is goodness itself.15 This is how he solves
the Euthyphro dilemma. Rather than arbitrary decrees, moral absolutes become
necessary corollaries of God’s divine nature and attributes.
Given the relationship between God’s nature and goodness, there are
significant implications for humanity. To be fully human is to exist in the fullness
that God intends for humanity. Therefore, to be fully human is to be good.16
Wilkinson closes with a critique of other systems of morality. First,
situation ethics ignore the importance of reflection, the process by which humans
think back on previous actions and form values. Wilkinson also challenges the
vagueness of the terms ‘situation’ and ‘welfare.’ The very concept of situation

13

Wilkinson, “God, Goodness, Fact and Value,” 413.

14

Ibid., 413.

15

Ibid., 414.

16

Ibid., 415.
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ethics seems to be challenged by the fact that some actions (for instance, burning
babies) are always wrong, whereas situation ethics holds that morality always
depends upon the situation.
Now that the article has been summarized broadly, weaknesses in
Wilkinson’s argument will be discussed. Wilkinson brushes aside Divine
Command Theory without much thought or argumentation, but perhaps it is not as
easily defeated as he suggests. He poses a scenario: suppose God were to command
some act which is considered immoral. He asserts that Divine Command Theory
immediately crumbles. Upon examination of the literature, it seems that Wilkinson
has erected a straw man of Divine Command Theory. Robert Adams espouses
Divine Command Theory and addresses the very issue that Wilkinson poses.
Adams includes in his theory the requirement that God’s commands only be
followed if He has the character of loving His human creatures. 17 It would appear
that Wilkinson leaves out consideration of what the “Divine” adds to Divine
Command Theory. Overall, Wilkinson’s dismissal of Divine Command Theory is
too hasty to offer a proper discussion of it as a moral theory.
One curious seeming inconsistency appears in Wilkinson’s arguments
concerning how humans are creatures of action. He says that value precedes human

17

David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls. Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality.
(Oxford University Press, 2011. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2011), 114.
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actions and that human action precedes thought about those actions.18 However,
Wilkinson seems to believe that reflection upon action is what leads to the
formation of values. How can value precede action and also come after reflection
upon past actions? It is unclear if this logical progression is truly his position or a
mistake. Perhaps this seeming discrepancy comes from mere semantics and could
be resolved, but Wilkinson’s theory needs more clarification in this area.
The question could be raised whether Wilkinson’s characterization of the
type of good that God desires is correct. He stresses that goodness is concerned
more with human fullness than mere rule-following.19 If Wilkinson is right, there
seems to be a disproportionately large number of rules in the Bible. Granted, he
accounts for Old Testament laws as useful in the pursuit of the good, even if
obedience to them is not goodness by itself. The question remains whether this is a
satisfactory characterization of how goodness ought to be conceived. Wilkinson’s
consistent emphasis on humankind could be construed to deemphasize other goals
of morality, including behavior in accordance with rules and the glorification of
God.
Finally, does Wilkinson adequately do what he has set out to do? Given his
moral system, is God necessary as lawgiver in order to have morality? He has

18

Wilkinson, “God, Goodness, Fact and Value,” 411.

19

Ibid., 416.
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succeeded in solving the Euthyphro Dilemma. His approach to the is/ought gap
seems successful. Beginning without any specific religious revelation, he has
proceeded to give a basic metaphysic, ontology, and morality. Wilkinson puts
humankind at the focus of his theory, centering his primary moral command around
humanity. Humans act, reflect, and create values based on this process. In doing so,
the is/ought gap is successfully bridged. Wilkinson has succeeded in providing a
system of morality which does not rest upon God or divine revelation but allows
for His existence. Wilkinson’s position is philosophically tenable. It succeeds in
grounding morality without traditional recourse to God as lawgiver, and starts and
ends with mankind, giving space for God to be the goodness and fullness that
mankind properly imitates in pursuing right action.
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